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This thesis investigates the Counterforce Potentials
model as a tool for decision makers in force mix analysis.
All theoretical forms and submodules methodology flow within
the model are reviewed, criticized, and analyzed for the
model's use in force mix analysis. As a linear model for
imputing values to weapon systems it is compared to other
linear model forms currently used in large scale models.
Numerical sensitivity analysis is applied to answer the key
questions of the model's characteristics and reaction to
various input changes. The analysis reveals that the model
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The Land Forces Division (LED) of the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and
Evaluation (OASDPA&E) desires a quick time computer model
to examine the effects of different U.S. weapon mixes against
a Soviet force. They want the model to include both direct
and indirect fire weapon systems for at least a division size
combined arms operation. When the Land Forces Division
examined the current models market they discovered that no
model met their criteria. In addition they felt that the
currently used firepower scores (FPS) based upon the product
of lethal area times expected ammunition expenditures and
the Anti-potential Potential (AP-P) eigenvalue approach did
not contain enough battlefield interrelationships and weapon
characteristics in their data to be useful in examining force
mix relationships. Therefore, they were looking for an
eigenvalue method which would employ more battlefield quali-
ties .
The LFD contracted with the System Planning Corporation
(SPC) for a model to accomplish their proposed force mix
analysis. The SPC's proposal was the Counterforce Potential
model written in August 1981 by F.W. Young and T.F. Hafer.
The question remains whether this model meets the needs
of the LFD. This answer is the goal of this thesis.

B. BACKGROUND/HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
1 . General Introduction
In a review of large scale modeling, the main methods
were linear models of imputing values to weapon system types.
Within these models, the subjective firepower score approach,
the lethal area times the expected ammunition expenditure
fire power score approach (which will be referred to as the
product method) , and the eigenvalue approach will be examined.
In Chapter IV these methods will be used to compare the consis-
tency of the Counterforce Potential (CP) results.
According to Lester and Robinson [1], a firepower score
is a single number representing the military worth or capa-
bility of a particular weapon system. Commonly, it is used
to develop a measure of combat potential of a force, which
can be of any size usually greater than a division. This is
achieved through the use of the firepower index. The index and
score are not synonymous, although they are closely related.
A score is a number assigned to a weapon system and an index
is the linear sum of the scores within a unit. The score is
also an input of a linear model, while the index is the scalar
output of the same model.
The index is a linear combination of the firepower
scores and represents the aggregation of all the weapon systems
within the force. The general linear formula, as shown by
James G. Taylor [2] is I = S.X.. Here S. reoresents the1
r l 1 1 £
1
firepower score of a weapon of type i and X. is the number of

weapon i that there are in the force. According to J.R. Bode
[3] , an index like the firepower score may be developed from
a totally subjective base, the product method, a combination
of the linear model with judgemental relationships (WEI/WUV)
,
or the eigenvalue method.
2 . Subjective Firepower Scores
a. General
In the subjective firepower score approach there
are two methods which will be described, "subjective" and
WEI/WUV.
The "subjective" method is a quite simple approach
A military committee subjectively assigns firepower score
values to weapon systems in accordance with a given bounded
scale
.
A more complicated subjective approach is the WEI/
WUV method. In this approach a committee of military person-
nel apply a subjective weighting (called a DELPHI number) to
weapon characteristics in order to develop a score for a
weapon in a particular family of weapons.
b. "Subjective" Firepower Scores
The easiest way of describing this methodology is
through an example. A committee of military officers placed
a subjective score on an entire weapon system. This committee
was provided the bounded scale (0-100) and the systems to be







) QUANTITY S .X.l l
Ml 6 1 100 100
M60 MG 3 10 30
Tank 19 10 190
Tow 10 5 50






Lester and Robinson [1] state that all of the
weapons considered are divided into seven classes according
to general functions and characteristics: portable small
arms, vehicle mounted small arms, tanks, Armored Vehicles,
anti-tank, artillery, and mortar. A standard weapon was
picked in each family: M16 , Mil 3, M60A1, M551, TOW, 15 5mm
Howitzer, and 10 7mm Mortar. Some versions allow the Ml 6 to be
the standard weapon for all the families so a better compara-
tive relation can be made. For each family, a set of dominant
characteristics was listed; for example: Tanks are defined
by firepower, mobility, and survivability.
For each weapon a WEI is defined as the weighted
sum of the dominant characteristics. J.R. Bode [3] gives an
20





+ W_C- + ... +
where W. are the subjective weights and C. are the dominant
characteristics. The W can be different for each i but
y W. = 1.0.
i
x
Each of the dominant characteristics is broken
down to subcharacteristics and each of those is also subjec-
tively weighted. The equation for each dominant characteris-
tic is: C. = 7 d.(Sc./Sc .) where the sum of the d. equals
1 h 1 i' si 1
l
one (1.0) and the Sc. are subcharacteristics normalized to the
l
standard weapon.
For example, the score for a tank (M60A1) would be
developed as follows for the dominant characteristics of fire-
power (F) , mobility (M) , and survivability (Z)
:
Firepower F = f( lethality, ammunition, aux-weapons)
F = .4(L/L ) + .3 (A/A ) + .3(aW/aW )
o o o




Survivability Z = f (speed, armor thickness)
where: armor thickness (T)
Z = .5(SP/SP + T/T )
where all the d. are subjective weights which can
l J




Let the Ml 6 be the standard weapon.
Let L = 200, Lg = 1, A = 48, P^ = 18, aW = 3, aWs = 1
Sp = 30, Sp = 1, T = 5, T = 1; then
F = .4(200) + .3(48/18) + .3(3) = 81.7
M = 30
S = .5(35) = 17.5
Thus
,
WEI(Tank) = .6(81.7) + .2(30) + .2(17.5) = 58.52 or 59.
The WEI/WUV system is a combination of subjective
weights applied to quantified characteristics. A completed
WEI/WUV system based on the Ml 6 being the standard weapon is
displayed in Table 2.
TABLE 2
WEI/WUV Score/Index
ITEM WEI QUANTITY S.X.
l l
Ml 6 1.0 100 100
M60 MG 8.0 10 80
Tank 59 10 590
TOW 40 5 200
Dragon 35 4 140




3 . Product Method
a. General
A more widely used approach is one in which the
score equals the product of lethal area and expected ammunition
expenditures. The single round lethality is found in tables
and is calculated from empirical data. The ammunition expen-
ditures (rate of fire) is a numerical constant and can be
found in tables or in technical manuals of the weapons. Most
of the empirical data for relating lethalities of point and
area fires were gathered in WWII. Lester and Robinson point
out the relationships and speculations that exist with the
WWII data [1]. Questionable areas include age of the data,
new versus old weapon types, and relevancy to current trends
in tactical warfare. These questionable areas make the use
of this empirical data for current model usage dubious.
b. Product Method Methodology
The data values (computed by the product method)
were extracted out of FM 105-5 [4] at 300 meters for the same
scenario as above. The scores were precomputed by the field
manual. The index is computed using the form: I = 7 S.X..
l
c. Rank Orderings of Weapons
The significance of the comparison of two methods
is their order ranking of the weapon systems, based upon





WEAPONS SCORE (S.) QUANTITY
Ml 6 1 100























M60 MG M60 MG M60 MG
M16 Ml 6 Ml 6
The ranking differences prove that problems in imputing rela-
tive values to weapon systems can develop depending upon the
chosen imputing method. A totally consistent method for
imputing value and achieving rankings is presently non-existent
24

These order rankings are important for sensitivity and force
mix analysis. Therefore it is critical to have a method that
is proven acceptable.
When these methods are used for both forces,
friendly (blue) and enemy (red) , we obtain two indices. The
force ratio is the ratio of these opposing indices. Although
in most models the force ratio is a value used to predict
battle outcomes we shall consider the static force ratio as
our measure of effectiveness (MOE) as it is in the Counter-
force Potentials model. Thus the force ratios must be consis-
tent among the methodologies. This will be examined in
Chapter IV.
4 . Eigenvalue Method
a. General
The third method to be examined is the eigenvalue
method. This method was developed for modeling in the early
1970 's, and had its origin in the IDAGAM model. It computes
firepower score values and thus can be used to provide force
ratios
.
The eigenvalue method says that the value of a
type i weapon system is equal to the value of everything it
can kill. Thus the eigenvalue approach is more scenario depen-
dent than the previously examined methods. The weapon quanti-
ties in the force level vectors and the attrition coefficients
for the scenario affect the values of each weapon.
25

An advantage to this approach is that it eliminates
the weighting factor from the subjective method. It addition-
ally allows the force levels and the scenario to impact upon
the resulting values of the weapons,
b. Methodology
According to Anderson [5] , the principle of the
Anti-potential Potential method is that the value of each
combatant of type i is proportional to the total value of
enemies it kills. The following methodology derivation for
the eigenvalue method is given:
Let X be a vector which represents the number of
systems of type i in the blue force: X = (X, ,X~ ,X, , . .
.
,X ).
Let Y be a vector which represents the number of systems of
type j in the red force: Y = (Y, ,Y 2 , Y , . . . ,Y ) . Now, S. and
y
S . are unknowns corresponding to the values of type i and j
systems for X and Y, respectively. Let a. . be a m x n matrix
which represent the rates type j systems kill type i systems
and b . . be a n x m matrix which represents the rate type i
systems kill type j systems. Recall this method is scenario
dependent, and this is represented by the input a. . and b.
.
matrices which vary with the scenario. The equation forms
are
:
X £ YCS = b..S.
j = l
Y ? X
C S = a. .S





C and C are proportionality constants;
a. . and b. . are attrition coefficient matrices;
13 ]i
X Y
S. and S. are weapon values.
Combining yields:
v T Y
C C S = (A B) S .
x y
This form is an eigenvalue problem of the form:
AZ = MZ
where
A is the eigenvalue and M is a matrix,
Where:
*





(A B) T = H = ((a
ij ) (b. ± ) )
T






(1) If (AB) then there exists for one real
A, A greater than 0, a corresponding eigenvector which is
greater than or equal to .
*
(2) A is the largest eigenvalue and corresponds
to C C = A .
x y
X *
(3) S is the eigenvector corresponding to A .
Early criticisms of this method include:
(1) the inability for the military leaders to
influence the relative value and ranking of the weapon systems
(2) interactions of the matrices a. . and b.
.
,
which can lead to S X and S^ that are paradoxical.
The System Planning Corporation picked the eigen-
value approach and sought to improve the calculations of the
values of each weapon system by reflecting more combat pro-
cesses on the a. . and b. . matrices. Their product was the
Counterforce Potentials model.
C. COUNTERFORCE POTENTIALS MODEL FLOW
The Counterforce Potentials model is designed to provide
a static measure of effectiveness for alternative blue (US)
weapons forces against a user specified red (Soviet) force.
The methodology is responsive to any scenario involving armor
oriented combined arms threat.
Hartman, J.K., Unpublished classnotes on Mathematical




The model assumes that ground forces fight to take or
hold terrain with direct fire weapons as their primary weapon
system. Another assumption is that the typical battle is
characterized by a continuous exchange of indirect fire in
support of short term direct fire engagements. The approach




The Counterbattery exchange is between indirect fire
weapons systems only. Its purpose is to assess the casualties,
damages, and suppressive effects of firing batteries against
their possible target batteries. It examines the general sup-
port activities of each force and uses the Quickie Artillery
model [6] to perform the calculations. The assessment tables
are used with specified user allocations of counterbattery and
countermaneuver battery ammunition to measure the degradation
of allocated fires for the countermaneuver exchange based on
the counterbattery exchange results.
3 Countermaneuver Exchange
The countermaneuver exchange considers the indirect
fire systems against the direct fire systems. It examines the
direct support activities of the forces and again uses the
Quickie model [6]. Fractional casualties, damage, and sup-
pression of direct fire weapons are calculated from density
(rounds per unit area) and the mean area of effectiveness
(MAE) of indirect munitions which are user specified.
29
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The direct fire exchange is between opposing direct
fire weapons that remain after the effects of the counter-
maneuver exchange are assessed. The 1 on 1 kill potential of
each weapon system in this model is defined as a function of
single shot kill probability (PPSK)
,
probability of engagement
and rate of fire. Average 1 on 1 kill potentials are calcu-
lated for each direct fire weapon pair based upon user speci-
fied distributions of ranges and force postures. Total kill
potentials, F. which correspond to the a. and b. matrices* 13 v ID Di
used in the eigenvalue method, are calculated in proportion
to the remaining number of direct fire weapons after the
countermaneuver exchange and in accordance with optional user-
specified allocations of fire, f. ., among potential target
types. This results in a series of killer-victim scoreboards
that show the potential number of kills for each type of
weapon against each weapon type in the force . These are
potential kills because they do not reflect the size or the
employment of the enemy in the kill rates. An example will





From the killer-victim scoreboards, P. and P.., an
eigenvalue method is used to compute the relative value of
each direct fire weapon system and the total of each direct
fire force. This eigenvalue approach assumes the value of
31

each weapon is proportional to the total value of the enemy
weapons it is capable of killing. An arbitrary weapon is
selected to be the base weapon with an assigned eigenvalue of
1.0. Using this method, the total value of the force is com-
puted by summing the values of direct fire weapons that sur-
vive the opposing Countermaneuver exchange. A force ratio is
then defined as the total blue force value divided by the total
red force value. The value of the ratio is the measure of
effectiveness, MOE , of the model. The objective of alternative
force mixes is to achieve the highest ratio against a constant
user specified enemy force.
D. INTRODUCTION SUMMARY
Major innovative changes in the calculations of the force
ratio are incorporated in this model. Although the analytic
forms of the eigenvalue method are quite similar to the
original AP-P methods, the methods of obtaining the inputs and
the type weapon systems used in the method are different. The
eigenvalue method in the CP model includes only the direct fire
weapons where past models have included both direct and indirect
fire weapons within their AP-P approach. The counterforce
potential's methods of incorporating the indirect fire weapon
are quite different from previous models, although easily
followed. It is critical with these new techniques to insure
that the model has not missed the intent of the requested in-
formation in its attempt to provide numerical solutions to the
user. These differences incorporated in the Counterforce
32

Potentials model will be examined to determine if they are
valid in the attempt to answer the force mix questions.
E. PREVIEW OF ANALYSIS
The flow of the submodules through their analytic forms
will be examined in Chapter II. The underlying assumptions
and the analytical form used to achieve the outputs, which
are used as inputs elsewhere within the model, will also be
viewed. Emphasis will be on the individual analytic form as
an input-output device for the model . The theoretical model
forms will be analyzed for their use in realistic combat fire-
power mix analysis.
In Chapter III the submodules will be linked and examined
for their inter-relationships. These submodules are the
Counterbattery , Countemaneuver , Direct fire, and Eigenvalue
modules. The order of implementation of the submodules will
be examined to determine if they provide realistic outputs
supporting tactical employment within combat modeling. The
goal will be to examine if the model, as linked together, can
be used as intended by the Land Forces Division, i.e., to
obtain the optimal force mix for the U.S. forces for given
scenarios
.
In Chapter IV will be an examination and comparison of
the Counterforce Potential model to the previously described
methods of subjective FPS, product FPS , and an earlier eigen-
value approach (similar to IDAGAM) . A specific scenario will
be given and the force ratios for each method will be calculated,

examined, and compared. Sensitivity analysis of the question
whether to increase tanks or artillery will also be examined
and compared. The goal is to check for consistency between
these methods.
Chapter V will be the conclusions and VI the recommenda-
tions to the Land Forces Division based upon the analysis.
34

II. DESCRIPTION OF ANALYTIC FORMS
In this chapter the analytic forms used within each sub-
module will be described, examined, and analyzed. This chap-
ter will flow in the same sequence shown in Figure 2. The
equations will be treated independently within their respec-
tive submodule.
A. COUNTERBATTERY EXCHANGE
1 . Rounds Fired in the Indirect Fire Submodules
The total number of rounds fired, N., is computed
for each particular type of indirect fire weapon.
a. Assumptions
All available weapon fire at a sustained rate of
fire over a given fire period.
b
.




N. = number of type i rounds fired;
W. = number of available type i weapons;
R. = maximum sustained rate of fire of weapon i;
T. = duration of the indirect fire period.
i r
c. Analysis
All the inputs to N. are user inputs. The user
inputs are W., the weapons, R. , the rate of fire, and T., the
period. The inputs of W. and T. are scenario dependent as each
35
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Figure 2 . Methodology Flow
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reflects changes to the force and the fire period respectively.
The maximum sustained rate of fire for weapon i, R. , is a
value which is obtained in a testing environment. R. can be
found in the technical characteristics data of each weapon
in its respective technical manual. Testing for each weapon
differs somewhat in conditions thus each test reflects differ-
ent effects on the maximum rate of fire. There exist many
other areas which affect achieving the maximum rate of fire
—
in particular, target acquisition. Rather than to try to
subjectively measure or quantify these effects on R.. , it
seems better to use the tested rate that is in the manuals.
The results of using these constants are an optimistic number
for the rounds fired by weapon i.
2 . Allocation of Rounds to the Indirect Fire Submodules
The total number of rounds fired are allocated to




(1) User can satisfactorily allocate the fraction
of rounds for the counterbattery exchange.
(2) The total number of rounds is equal to the
sum of the rounds expended in the two submodules.










N. = number of type i rounds allocated to
counterbattery;
CB
f. = user-specified counterbattery allocation
for weapon type i (0 <_ f 1) ;
CM





The user input of the f. is critical
and needs to have a more sound basis from empirical data than
to be subjectively obtained. The computational form is a
straight forward fractional form. It is important for the
user to have a basic idea of the allocation for the fractional
amount of rounds fired for counterbattery. Most artillery
officers claim that there is no straightforward way to allo-
cate fractional fires since the counterbattery mission is
highly dependent upon the enemy weapons being detected and
engaged [93. It seems possible to measure this fractional
CB
allocation, f.
, in one of these three presented manners.
(1) Assume that the indirect weapons have only
two missions, counterbattery and countermaneuver and that
these are sole dedicated missions. These missions are assigned
at battalion level either being Direct Support (for counter-
C3
maneuver) or General Support (for counterbattery) . Then f
.
can be estimated as the sum of the General Support weapon
i's divided by the total number of weapon i in the force.
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(2) The user's specification of susceptible
weapons to counterbattery fire can be used to set up an
allocation scheme. The fraction f can be the sum of the
susceptible weapon i divided by the sum of these weapons




= (7 Sc.I.)/(Y Sc.I.) + (J Q.)1 V 13.'? 11 V ^l
where
Sc. = the percent of type i weapons that are
susceptible to counterbattery fire;
I. = the number of indirect fire weapons i;
Q. = the number of direct fire weapons i.
(3) Subjective assignment by the user as cur-
rently done in the model
.
In the above allocation schemes flaws still exist
In case (1) each battery of Direct and General Support will
not always fire sole dedicated missions but will fire both
counterbattery and countermaneuver missions. In case (2) the
examination requires intelligence information which probably
will not be available during advance planning. In case (3)
the subjective input may give radically different results.




3 . Average Volleys Fired by Each Battery Weapon
a. Assumptions
A proportionality relationship exists in the
determination of volley quantities.
CB
b. Model Form: V.. = (N . *M. ) /(M. xq )lj 1 j ' l T
Where:
V. . = average number of type i volleys fired
against each opposing type j battery;
CB
N. = number of type i rounds allocated for
counterbattery fires;
M. = number of weapons per type i firing battery;
M. = number of weapons per type j target battery;
QT = the total number of indirect fire weapons
in the opposing force that are susceptible
to counterbatterv fire.
c. Analysis
This quantity is an expected value for volleys at
a J target battery. There are no priorities of fires and each
battery is designated by user inputs as susceptible or not
susceptible. The number of volleys is influenced by the
user specification of susceptibility. As an expected value
there is no provision for a massing or concentration of
fires at a target.
The model has tables for the 1,2,4,6,8,10,12,16,
20, and 24 volley effects for damages, casualties, and sup-
pression. Thus if the computational volley, V. . is not one
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of the tabulated volleys than an interpolation for effects
must be used in the next sequence.
4 . Fractional Effects in Counterbattery
The fractional effects for damages, casualties, and
suppression are calculated for the value of V. ., the average
volleys fired by each battery weapon.
a. Assumptions
(1) The effects are deterministic events for a
given number of volleys.
(2) Effects of damages, casualties, and suppres-
sion can be expressed by the same deterministic functional
form with different coefficients.
(3) The effects are approximated by an exponen-
tial expression.
(4) If V. is not one of the tabulated V theni]
it will be between two which are thus interpolated for the
subsequent effects.
(5) The maximum number of volleys is 24.







f. = fractional loss (D,C, or S)
;
v = the number of volleys of interest;








and v„ and vT are the nearest tabulated number of volleys
rl Li
(vT < v < vu ) with corresponding fractional effectiveness
values of fT and f„.
li rl
c. Analysis
The exponential expression tends to be the
intuitive approach since as the number of volleys is increased
the fractional effects, f. . , of damages, casualties, and
suppression also increase. In examining the form, it is
important to verify that the interpolation is correct for
the cases where V = VT and V = V„.
J_i rl
(1) Case 1: V = VL









At this point, the aV 's would be expected to cancel and the
Li
final exponent of e should be ln(l-f ) and not -ln(l-fL ) . In
this case the sign of b in the original form should be nega-
tive. The form should be: f. . = 1-exp (- (av-b) )
.
(2) Case 2: V = Vu
rl
1 - exp (- (av + b)
f = 1 - exp(-(av + ln(l-f) + avR ;
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Again at this point the av„ ' s are expected to cancel and the
exponent of e should be ln(l-f). In order to achieve this
the original form should be: f. . = 1-exp (- (av-b) )
.
As shown in the two cases a sign error exists in
the documentation. The results using this form will yield
incorrect interpolations and erroneous effects. If this error
does not exist in the computer code or when it is corrected,
then results yielded would be a correct interpolative effect
of the number of volleys fired.
5 . Total Fractional Losses in Counterbattery
a. Assumptions
(1) The fractional casualties, damages, and









(3) Weighting factor in the interval [0,1] must
be applied for suppression to account for the length of firing
period in regards to the length of the suppression (default of
. 5 is assumed)
.
(4) For reasoned suppression recovery is in
seconds
.
(5) For unit disruption recovery in 15-20 minutes
(6) Model assumes unit disruption only.
I




] i=1 i] ID s i]
the total combined fractional losses to




C. . = fractional casualties from weapon type i;
D. . = fractional damages from weapon type i;
S. . = fractional suppression from weapon type i;
w = suppression weighting factor.
s
c. Analysis
The assumption of independence is highly suspect.
For an individual weapon type i firing at target j the frac-
tional effects are obtained. It seems reasonable that an
artillery round that impacts which causes damages should also
cause casualties to personnel for the weapon damaged. It also
seems reasonable that if a round impacts causing casualties
that there is a good probability that it also caused damages
to their weapon system. In the same sense the round which
causes damages and casualties could suppress weapon and per-
sonnel near the impact. Thus it appears intuitive for a
particular weapon i firing at a target j the effects of
damages, casualties, and suppression are not independent but
dependent events. It is not expected that the three effects
would occur as independent points due to an impact point. A
more likely expression would be for the events to occur within
a given area dependent upon each other.
The above argument holds true for the effects of
successive volleys from a weapon i. A weapon firing volleys
at the same target would cause the same relationship to the
effects as the single round case. Thus the effects of weapon
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i would still be considered dependent events. For example,
if a forward observer reports the target is down the weapon
discontinues its mission. This shows that a weapon fires are
dependent upon the results of the previous rounds effects.
For the effects of different weapons firing at
target j it appears reasonable to assume independence. The
effect of the other weapon round will not affect the damages
or casualty effects of the other weapon. The effects due to
the round for suppression could be affected by the other
weapon rounds and thus independence is not a good assumption
for the suppression effects.
According to Fort Sill there exist later versions
of the Quickie model [7] which overcome many of the statisti-
cal independence problems. The SPC employs an earlier version
of the Quickie model [6] in which the independence assumptions
are not overcome. The later version should be considered for
inclusion in the model.
Suppression and the use of the suppression weight-
ing factor in this model do not express the possible events
relative to suppressive fires. In the Mitre Corporation's
"Counterforce Campaign Analysis" [8], they express three
events which could occur relative to suppressive fires.
(1) The unit receiving the fires ceases his
mission and does nothing.
(2) The unit receiving the fires ignores the
effects, buttons up, and continues his missions.
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(3) The unit moves from the position receiving
the fires and continues operations and missions.
These are reasonable events to consider for sup-
pression. Considering these events as variables, the weighting
factor encompasses too many variables to be estimated by a
constant value for a given scenario. Since the events do not
occur across the battlefield uniformly, it seems inappropriate
to assign one number to represent all the events.
Combat Developments at Fort Sill treats suppression
as a highly suspect area in modeling. Models based upon
historical suppressive data may not be appropriate for the
new and future weapon systems. It may be better to eliminate
the suppressive effects until a better scheme is developed to
express the events and the effects adequately.
6 . Total Effectiveness of the Indirect Weapon Type
a. Assumptions
(1) Rate of losses over the firing period is
constant
.




E = average fractional effectiveness of weapon i;




Our value here is the average fractional effec-
tiveness of the weapon type. There dees not seem to be any
suspect area in this modeling approach.
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At the beginning of the time period there are
100% of the opposing indirect fire systems. Loss takes place
at a constant rate over the period so losses equal the loss
rate times the period. The average losses over the period
are L/2 . The effectiveness of the indirect fire systems is
then, on the average, l-L/2. The counterbattery and counter-
maneuver exchanges occur over the same period of time so the















1 . Calculation of the Number of Countermaneuver Rounds
a. Assumptions
Effectiveness of weapon i impacts upon its ability
to fire rounds.





U. = number of countermaneuver rounds fired by
type i weapons;
E. = the average fractional effectiveness of the
firing weapon type i;
CM
N. = the number of rounds allocated for counter-
i * •maneuver fires
c. Analysis
Previously the number of rounds for the counter-
CM CB
maneuver exchange was expressed as N/ = N. (1 - f . ). This wasr c ill
the optimistic number of rounds allocated to countermaneuver.
CM CB
N. is equal to N. + N. . The adjusted form reflects the
degradation due to the attrition effects.
It is not clear why the total degradation factor
is applied solely to countermaneuver except for modeling
convenience. The counterbattery exchange fires the optimistic
number of rounds and countermaneuver exchange fires adjusted
number of rounds. The order of combat firing sequence is
significant and will be addressed later but let it suffice to
to say that countermaneuver should receive some degradation
but not the entire factor.
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2 . Calculation of Fractional Losses in Countermaneuver
a. Assumptions
(1) Loss is a deterministic function of den-
sity and MAE.
(2) The function is approximated by an exponen-
tial expression.
(3) The density is equal to total rounds/total
area.
(4) Total area is equal to the number of direct
fire weapons in the target force divided by the assumed
average density of the same weapons in the formations we
expect will be used.





f . . = fractional losses in damages, casualties,
J or suppression;
d. = density of i's rounds per meter squared
1 (m2 )




U. = countermaneuver rounds for weapon i;




The basic theoretical form reveals as density,
MAE, or both increase with the other factors held constant
as the effectiveness increases. This is what we would expect
to theoretically occur. The exponential expression is
intuitively pleasing.
2According to T. Hafer, for a given area of size
A the loss rate is independent of the size of the target
force. For example, in an area of size A the rate of losses
to tanks is 25% regardless of the number of tanks in the area.
Thus in the basic form the approach employs area type fires
for the indirect fire systems against the direct fire force.
The System Planning Corporation provides the user
an expression for the area A when the user is in an attacking
posture. The expression is: A = T/Z. In this expression,
T is the number of direct fire weapons and Z is their assumed
density in their target formations. This approach assumes a
great deal of intelligence information for the firing sys-
tems, which would not reasonably be the case for an entire
force
.
The emphasis on density and MAS still imply area
type fires over a given area. There is no provision for massing
of fires, the most significant generator of combat fire power
provided by the artillery against a target [9]. The form
must be sensitive to this attribute of artillery.
2Hafer, T., Interview, Naval Postgraduate School, July 1982
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3 . Total Fractional Loss of Each Direct Fire Weapon Type
a. Assumptions
(1) Fractional losses are independent and
deterministic functions.
(2) Independence by weapon and target types.
I
b. iModel Form: L. = 1 - II (1-C. .) (1-D. .) (1-w S . .)
3 i=1 ID i: s ID
Where:
L . = total combined fractional losses to the j
J direct fire weapon from all the effects for
type I firing weapons;
C.
.
= fractional casualties from weapon type i;
D.
•
= fractional damages from weapon type i;
S.- = fractional suppression from weapon type i;
w = suppression weighting factor.
c. Analysis
The analysis is generally as expressed in Section
A. 4 .c.
As before, the independence question is suspect.
The direct fire weapon systems have a different relationship
between the man-machine systems than do the indirect fire
systems. The direct fire system is self-contained. Thus
damages, casualties, and suppression are dependent upon the
round from system i and not independent for all firing weapons
at the direct fire system.
The arguments for the single round and the single
as described previously are even more valid against the
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direct fire system than they were against other indirect
fire systems. The effects are suspect as independent events.
4 . Total Fractional Effectiveness in Countemaneuver
a. Assumptions
(1) Effectiveness is a deterministic function
and has values between (0,1)
.
(2) Losses are a deterministic function with
value between (0,1)
.




E. = fractional effectiveness of each type
direct fire weapon;
L. = total combined fractional loss to the i
direct fire weapon from all the effects
for j type firing weapons
.
c. Analysis
It is important to relate why effectiveness is
now equal to 1-L whereas before it was equal to l-L/2.
Before the losses at the end of the period were not the objec-
tive. The average losses were used to get the average effec-
tiveness of indirect fire systems for the countermaneuver
exchange. Now the indirect fire systems are engaging the
direct fire system. The model assumes that all the indirect
fire exchanges occur prior to the direct fire engagement. Thus
the objective is the total losses at the end of the indirect
fire period. At the end of the period there are L losses.







At time T' the
losses are at
L ' . The average
loss is L ' .
E = 1-L'
Figure 4. Fractional Effectivness Due to Losses
C. DIRECT FIRE EXCHANGE
1. Direct Fire Kill Potentials, K . . (1 on 1)
a. Assumptions
(1) Kill potentials are a measure of the number
of targets (of a particular type) that a surviving direct
fire weapon would be able to kill during a single direct
fire engagement. It is an i on j engagement pair.
(2) Engagement period is assumed to be one (1)
minute
.
(3) Shooters posture, attacking or defending is
not considered.
(4) Cardiod hit distribution is used for single
shot kill probability.
(5) Rayleigh distribution is used to express
the probability of an engagement at range R.
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(6) All weapon target pairs (i versus j) are
considered.
(7) Assume a single direct fire engagement
period.
oo
b. Model Form: K . . = Tn / N(R) P, (R) p(R) dR1J U q K
Where
:
K . . = the 1 on 1 kill potential of i direct fire
ij
weapon type against j target weapon type;
T D = length of the direct fire period in minutes;
N(R) = the rate of fire at range R (shots per minute)
;
P,, (R) = single-shot kill probability at range R;
p ( R) = probability that an engagement will occur
at range R and
oo
/ p(R)dR = 1.
N(R) = 60/{t, + tf), where:
t, = detection time in seconds;
t_ = firing time in seconds.
c. Analysis
The direct fire kill potential is a value assigned
to each weapon target pair. This value is a measure of the
number of particular type targets that a surviving direct
fire weapon would be able to kill during a single period of
direct fire engagements. In the theoretical form the kill
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potentials are a function of time, range, Pssk, probability
of engagement, and rates of fire.
The firing time t- is a user input. The firing
time consists of the total time between shots to guide the
round to the target (as in the TOW) , to reload, and to aim
at another target in an assumed target rich environment. The
definition of t f must vary from weapon to weapon to reflect
whether any of the functions can be accomplished simultaneously
For example a tank can reload and aim at the same time but a
LAW cannot. It appears with this definition that the user
may have a hard time making a good estimate for t f . It would
be an advantage for the user if this data were obtained and
tabularized for use within the model.
The detection time parameter, t,, is meant to be
a variable which reflects time to detect in a target lean en-
vironment so systems can employ and take advantage of their
target acquisition capabilities. Currently the model is not
using t, as a function of acquisition and range. The parameter
t, is significant in the calculation of N(R) . The parameter
must reflect target acquisition as a function of the type
system and the range. Like t f , t. should be provided as real
data available for use in the model.
The probability of single shot kill at range R is
tabularized. It is derived from a cardiod hit distribution.
This particular distribution is used often in the modeling









180-120 "^<_- -f P360_330






Kill |Hit " Jx
Pi-P(KiH laspect angle i) P^ = P^ PKm^
Figure 5. Cardioid Hit Distribution
It is a realistic expression of single shot kill
probabilities
.
The p ( R) , probability of engagement at range R,
has been characterized as a Rayleigh distribution. Young and
Hafer relate they chose the Rayleigh due to its following
advantages: (1) it represents the distribution of ranges be-
tween a point in the cartesian coordinate system and a set
of normally distributed points and (2) it is characterized by
a single parameter which facilitates rapid sensitivity analysis
The distribution appears to reflect more than just
a probability of engagement. It reflects for a given a param-






Figure 6. The Rayleigh Distribution
likely range of engagement. The peaks of the distribution
reflect the highest probability of an engagement. For example
in the case of a = 500 meters (which relates to mountainous,
or heavily forrested terrain, a firer would more likely engage
a target at a range of 500 meters than at a range of 1000






This analysis shows that in this type of terrain
the firer's most likely engagement range is 500 meters.
The individual weapon target kill potential, K. .
,
is calculated for each type i versus each type j system. K.
.
reflects a one on one by weapon type kill potential. K.
.
assumes that i directs all of its fires at each target j for
the entire engagement period. K. . is then the potential kill
rate of weapon i at target j. For example, assume we have
tanks (i) firing at saggers, BMPs , and troops the j targets.




1 on 1 Kill Potentials
K. . Sagger Troops BMP
Tanks .6 .8 .3
These represent possible 1 on 1 kill potentials of the tank
against the j targets. This example illustrates the highest
1 on 1 kill potential is troops. As this example is continued
in the analysis the significance of the values of K. . will
be seen to be modified by other factors
.
2. Killer- Victim Scoreboards, Total Kill Potentials P.
1 1:)
a. Assumptions
(1) Scoreboard values represent the number of
target kills by type target for each firing weapon type.
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(2) The allocation fraction f. is dependent
upon the option the user selects
.
(3) There are three option allocations for f .
.
numbers, threat, ability to kill the threat.
developed.
(4) No other option schemes for f. have been
(5) Number of effective i weapons is Q. times
E. .
1
(6) Allocation options are provided to the user
for each weapon type.
b. Model Form: P.. = f . . xQ. xE, xR.
.





= total kill potential of weapon i against
-1 weapon j ;
f. . = fractional allocation of the force's avail-
* able weapon-on-minutes of type i against
type j targets;
Q. = quantity of weapon i in the force;
E. = fractional effectiveness of weapon i from
countermaneuver exchange;
K. . = 1 on 1 kill potential of weapon i against
-
1 target j assuming all fires that are at j .






= q./ y q .
ID D it 1 D
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:.. = Q. K. ./ T Q.K..
ID D ^ j = l J :1
.. = Q.K..K../) Q . K. K.
.
ID D Di ID j£ x D Di ID
where
:
f . . = fractional allocation of firing type i
-' against target type weapon j ;
Q. = the number of type j target weapons in the
j opposing force, unless the 1 on 1 kill
potential is zero, then Q. equals zero;
K. . = the 1 on 1 kill potential of firing weapon
-" against the target weapon;
K. . = the 1 on 1 kill potential of the target
-
1 weapon against the firing weapon.
c. Analysis
The f . . factor represents the fraction of force
ID *
available weapon-minutes of type i potential allocated against
type j targets . The factor can be expressed in terms of the
number of available target weapons, their proposed threat,
or i's ability to kill j's threat. The forms of f. . are linear1 J ID
fractions, where the sum over j of f . is one (1.0) for all i.
These schemes are reasonable allocation methods. The forms
are simple yet adequate to achieve the fractional results
desired. Although priorities of direct fire are not addressed
it does appear as though the three allocation methods cover
the possible priorities. The only questionable area in the
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allocation methods is why Q. was used and not Q. xE. product.
It appears that the fractional effectiveness of the J force
should play into the allocation scheme of the i potential.
The E . factor could alter the allocation schemes and perhaps
have six available methods.
The factor Q., the available i systems, and E.,
the fractional effectiveness of the i force, are used together
to give the realization that not all weapons are at 100 per-
cent ability. Their product will yield the usable weapon
count of i type weapons. It is this factor that is considered
with the allocation factor f times the one on one kill poten-
tial to achieve the potential number of target kills by type,
P. ., for each firing weapon type. Thus the product is the
total potential of type i weapon against type j targets for
direct fire weapon systems.
The P. . is the total force potential of type i
weapons against type j targets. Continuing the example from
the one on one kill potentials, the calculation for P. for* 13
100 Tanks (system i) with an effectiveness, E, of .75 using
the form P. = K. .Q.E.f. . would be as shown below in Table 6.
13 13*1 i 13
Let there be an opposing force consisting of 50 Saggers, 200
Individual Troops, and 40 BMPs. Using the option of allocation
by threat where K.. is (.8,. 01, 13) for the kill rates of the
























It is significant to point out that although the K. . against
the troops is the highest potential 1-1 kill rate, that the
troops receive the lowest total kill potentials. The frac-
tional allocation, f. ., is the contributor to this change.
The low threat by the enemy troops led to the tanks potential
kills going to the Saggers and BMPs
.
The P. are called potentials because the number
ID
of opposing weapons by type may be less than the total number
of potential kills calculated.
D. EIGENVALUE METHOD
1. Relative Values of the Forces
a. Assumptions
(1) The value of each weapon is proportional to
the value of the weapons it is capable of killing.
(2) C equals 3 , and C eauals 3 •
x n x y y
(3) Beta, 3, is the constant of proportionality




(4) One weapon type is assigned an arbitrary-
value of 1.0.
(5) In normal eigenvalue methods there are no
guarantees of unique solutions.
(6) By eliminating indirect fire weapons we can
guarantee unique solutions.





<(1/QR ) 7 P . . V3i l
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Where
:
VT = the value of a single type i Blue weapon;
V. = the value of a single type j Red weapon;
Q. = the initial number of type i weapons in the
force
;
Q . = the initial number of type j weapons in the
-1 force;
P. . = the total kill potential of i against j;
P. . = the total kill potential of j against i.
With proportionality constant beta, 3/ yields:
V3 = d/QB ) P-.VR
1 x j=i L J J
SVR = (1/QR ) I PV-S




The theoretical form is consistent with the form
discussed by B. Anderson in the IDAGAM model [5]. The method
performs as described in the background of Chapter I. The
lack of indirect fire weapons in the eigenvalue computations
is of concern but will be addressed in Chapter III.
2 . Indices and Force Ratio
a. Assumptions
A linear model relationship exists.




B 3Blue force value = > Q . V^
.
*•- l l1=1
J R RRed force value = Q 1, V.
c . Analysis
The forms are consistent in their linear relation-
ships with the forms expressed by Prof. J.G. Taylor and the
IDAGAM model [2,5]. Although consistent with previous rela-
tionships it is questionable whether these forms exhibit the
necessary characteristics to be useful in force mix analysis.
According to Lester and Robinson [1], a critical
shortcoming in the firepower score method with constant weapon




the model the change in I is proportional to changes in num-
bers but real world evidence indicates that changes in the
mix of weapons has a strong influence on the relative value
of each weapon type. In the model the value of the 1000th
weapon is the same as the 1st, 10th, and 100th weapon of the
same type. This exhibits no diminishing marginal returns as
weapons are added [1,3]. A saturation point would be expected
whereby the addition of more weapons would no longer contribute
to combat potential and then the model would exhibit diminish-
ing marginal returns. The diminishing marginal returns effect
should exist in the model.
The value V in the Counterforce Potentials model
is an implicit function of allocations, effectiveness, weapon
quantities, and one on one kill potentials. An increase in
the number of direct fire weapon i affects not only the total
kill potentials i on j , P.., but also j on i, P.., and thusr J
' lj ' J ]1
the values of VT,vvfor all i,j in the Blue and Red forces are
also affected. This is significantly different from previous
firepower scores and this characteristic is valuable. Thus
all the relative values may change for both the red and blue
force with just the change in one weapon i's quantity. The
saturation and the diminishing marginal returns issue will
be investigated in Chapter IV.
The force ratio is used to compare the total blue
force value to the total red force value. Inprevious dynamic
combat models the force ratio is used to predict damages,
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casualties, and maneuver distances. The force ratio here is
a static comparison of force values. The ratio form indi-
cates that the weapon values must be ratio scale numbers. It
does not seem unreasonable to assume an absolute zero point
exists for all weapon values.
A difference relationship of blue and red values
seems reasonable to investigate as an alternative to the ratio
method. An example will best illustrate the investigation.
Case 1: Let V3 = 10 , and VR = 30. The force ratio
is .3 and the difference measured by v -V is -20. In case
2 let the blue value be 12 and the red value 33. The force
ratio is .3636 but the difference is -21. In the difference
relationship the greatest value is better thus case 1 would
be chosen. In the force ratio method case 2 would be chosen.
The force ratio tends to make more sense to the military mind
whose normal military training causes him to think in terms
of ratios and not differences.
The force ratio tends to be the better approach as
the measure of effectiveness used to quantify the impact of




In Chapter III the input-output flow between the sub-
modules will be examined in relationship to the goal of the
model. The flow will be consistent with Figure 7.
DATA AND ASSUMPTIONS SUBMODELS RESULTS
Weapons end Forces



































Figure 7. Methodology Flow
The goal of the model as related by Mr. Hap Miller and Mr.
4Tom Hafer is to enable the decision makers to analyze the
Miller, Hap, Interview, Naval Postgraduate School,
April 19 82.
4Hafer, T., Interview, Naval Postgraduate School, July 1982
67

force mix changes against a constant opposing force in order
to determine if the best force mix structures of US forces
have been achieved. The measure of effectiveness, MOE, for







The key input and output of this submodule are the
N. , the input for the number of rounds fired in this sub-
module, and E., the output for the fractional effectiveness
PR
of the indirect fire weapon types. N. is solely a function
of user inputs: the number of weapon i (W.) , the rate of fire
of weapon i (R.) , the length of the indirect fire period (T.)
,
and the fractional allocation of fires to counterbattery
CB
(f. ) . The fractional effectiveness of weapon i, E., is calcu-
lated as one minus the product of fractional losses to weapon
i and is carried to the next submodule for use as an input.
2 Problems in the Counterbattery Submodule
a. No Degradation of Rounds Fired in Counterbattery
During the 30 minute indirect fire period the
optimistic number of rounds to be fired is all expended. Al-
though attrition is taking place to the opposing susceptible
indirect fire systems during the period the number of rounds
fired by i at j , or j at i remains fixed throughout the ex-
change. All remaining submodules take into account degradation
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or attrition in their exchange. The methodology should re-
flect the on-going attrition in a degradation of the number
of rounds expended in the counterbattery exchange.
b. Counterbattery Submodule Proceeding Countermaneuver
This proposed organization is somewhat contradic-
tory to the logical flow of combat. Counterbattery missions
firing first are only valid when firing preparatory fires
preceeding an attack [9] and depend heavily on intelligence
information and use area fires. Since this model employs a
weapon susceptibility to counterbattery fires it does not
seem to be reflecting the preparatory fires but the fires
directed at thwarting the enemy's firing of missions which
would prohibit our maneuver forces from performing their mis-
sion [9]. Normally during a direct fire battle the opposing
forces fire indirect fires at the maneuver forces. These
firing systems become subject to detection and, if detected,
will be engaged by the other indirect fire systems. Thus,
in most cases, the counterbattery exchange would occur after
the start but during the countermaneuver exchange.
c. User Specification of Susceptibility to Counter-
battery Fire
The user's designation of the indirect fire weapons
as susceptible or not susceptible to counterbattery fire does
not account for all the possible cases mentioned for the reason
to fire counterbattery. In most cases the indirect fire sys-
tems become detected and engaged by opposing indirect fire
systems. The probability of detection (based on rounds fired
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per weapon) and the conditional probability of engagement
given a detection should be employed in lieu of user speci-
fication. Range could be a determining factor in that sys-
tems out of opposing firing range would not be considered
in the counterbattery exchange. All other systems not affected
by the range should be considered using the probability of
detection and the conditional probability of engagement given
a detection.
d. The Meaning of the Fractional Effectiveness, E.
The fractional effectiveness of indirect fire
weapons is dominated by the optimistic number of rounds ex-
pended and the user's specification of which weapons will
receive counterbattery. This allows the user to directly
influence the entire exchange.
B. COUNTERMANEUVER EXCHANGE
1 . Input-Output Flow
The key input for this submodule is the fractional
effectiveness of each indirect fire weapon, E., from the
counterbattery exchange and the output is the fractional
effectiveness, E., of each direct weapon. The input is used
to degradate the number of rounds expended in the counter-
maneuver exchange. The output is carried to the direct fire




2 . Problems in the Counter-maneuver Exchange
a. The Countermaneuver Exchange Comes After
Counterbattery
As stated in the previous section the counter-
maneuver exchange should not logically follow the counter-
battery exchange.
b. The Countermaneuver Receives the Entire
Degradation of Rounds
In this section the entire degradation is applied
prior to the exchange beginning. In most cases the counter-
maneuver exchange would begin its fires at full strength. As
attrition occurs, due to counterbattery, the number of rounds
is reduced. Perhaps a discrete time interval which reflects
attrition to counterbattery and thus reduces rounds applied
to both exchanges would be a better reflection of the combat
abilities of indirect fire weapons.
c. No Concentration of Fires
The most unique and significant generator of immedi-
ate combat power is the ability of US fire support to mass
their fires, i.e., many battalions firing accurately on the
same target [9] . In this submodule there is no provision for
this key mission of the artillery. The opposing weapons are
not being exposed to mass fires therefore their fractional
effectiveness is not reflecting total kill potential of the
indirect fire systems.
d. No Attrition to the Indirect Fire Systems by
Direct Fire Systems
The maneuver elements' mortars are considered an
indirect fire system and are generally deployed in range of
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direct fire systems. Their deployment makes them suscepti-
ble to direct fire weapons. This is not considered in the
model. None of the indirect fire systems are ever attrited
by direct fire weapons. Interactions of direct and indirect
weapons is important for force mix questions , thus the ab-
sence of the impacts of direct fire on indirect fire weakens
the force mix relationships.
e. The Meaning of the Output, E.
The output E. is the fractional effectiveness of
direct fire weapons due to the opposing indirect fire weapons.
This output is biased by having all round degradation applied
to this exchange.
f. No Value Given to Indirect Fire Weapons
In order to adequately assess force mix questions
the indirect fire systems should have a value assigned to
them which can be related to the direct fire values.
C. DIRECT FIRE EXCHANGE
1 . Input-Output Flow
The fractional effectiveness, E., from the Counter-
maneuver exchange is used as an input in the calculation of
the total kill potentials of the direct fire weapons. It is
used with the one on one kill potentials, K. ., calculated
internally in this submodule, and the user specified allocation
of fire option and the number of direct fire weapons i to
get the output, P.., and the total kill potentials. These
"^ J
P. . and P. . are the matrices of the eigenvalue method.
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2 . Problems with the Direct Fire Exchange
a. No Foot Soldiers in the Model
There are currently no provisions for foot soldiers
with their basic rifles and machine guns. A force mix struc-
ture in the US Army today is predominantly foot soldier
oriented. Several divisions, the 7th and 9th, are unmechanized
Infantry divisions and thus are even more dominated by the
foot soldier. The model needs to be responsive for all divi-
sions' force mix questions to be an effective analytic tool.
b. The Implied Use of T_., the Direct Fire Period
Length
It is implied in the methodology review that the
value of T D can be changed to reflect a longer fire period,
thus affecting the kill potentials. In fact the value of T
is doing no more than acting as a scale parameter applied
equally to all P. . and P. .. Eigenvalue methods are invariant
to scale changes and thus a change in T has no effect on kill
potentials or the subsequent weapon values.
D. EIGENVALUE METHOD
1 . Input-Output Flow
The killer-victim scoreboards, the P. and P.., are the
ij 31
key input to the eigenvalue method. These matrices reflect
the scenario dependence of the eigenvalue methodology. They
correspond to the a. and b.. matrices explained earlier.
The outputs of the method are the relative values of the




2 . Problems in the Eigenvalue Method
a. Indirect Fire Weapons in the Force Ratio
Calculation
The force ratio does not explicitly reflect the
value of the indirect fire weapons. Force mix questions con-
cerning indirect fire systems are not explicitly addressed in
th i s methodo logy
.
b. Weapon Changes and Their Effects on Weapon Values
The effect that an increase in a weapon i has on
weapon values and the resulting force ratio cannot be alge-
braically examined. The shortcomings previously mentioned
of linearity and the failure to display diminishing marginal
returns may occur in this model. This will be investigated
numerically in Chapter IV.
E. THE FORCE MIX ANALYSIS
1 . General
After the scenario is run the model proposes that by
varying weapon quantities a new force ratio is obtained and
compared to the original or previous force ratios. Within
the model a change in weapon quantities affects not only the
value of that weapon type but also the value of opposing weapon
types. Although the opposing force size remains fixed in
quantity its relative value changes. The force ratio is not
just an improved blue force value being compared to the same
red value but a completely new ratio of a new blue value to
a new red value. A higher ratio is an improvement in the
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force mix according to the model's methodology and assumptions
In most cases the user will have to reexercise the model in
order to obtain the force ratio. The user requires a means
in which to begin his force mix analysis. Haphazard changing




Predetermined Weapons and Quantities in Force Mix
Analysis
This is the simplest case, whe e the user knows prior
to the original run which weapons and their quantities are to
be examined. Inputing the changes in quantities and rerunning
the model yields the new force ratio for the user to compare
with the previous ratio. The user tests all his quantity
changes and the best ratio implies the best force mix for that
scenario
.
3 Weapons Not Predetermined For Force Mix Analysis
a. Direct Fire Weapons Versus Direct Fire Weapons
In this case it seems feasible to allow the weapon
value to determine the starting point for force mix analysis.
Normally the weapon with the highest value would be a reason-
able choice for further analysis. A high value implicitly
implies survivability traits, thus it is a logical choice for
force mix analysis.
b. Indirect Versus Direct Fire Systems
The indirect versus direct fire systems question,
which is a significant decision for today's commanders, can-
not be analyzed in a straightforward manner. The direct fire
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weapons receive a relative value and thus can be rank ordered.
The indirect weapons are not as well defined in the model and
neither receive a value nor are rank ordered. A comparison
of the perceived worth of an indirect weapon versus a direct
fire weapon is not clearly available after the original run.
There are no hints in the model as to the answer. It appears
that the only available method is a system of trial and error
where the user makes changes to weapons of the indirect and
direct fire weapons and compares the resulting force ratios.
c. Indirect Versus Indirect Fire Weapons
The user is again faced with the same problem as
before, where to begin? The model gives no relative value or
rank ordering to the indirect fire weapons so the user does
not know which indirect system is achieving the most success.
Again the user seems to be forced to a system of trial and
error as before.
4 . Summary
If the model's methodology for calculating and using
the force ratios is acceptable, then a methodology must be
addressed for force mix analysis. In previous models employ-
ing imputing linear values to weapons, all weapons received
relative values and were rank ordered. Thus the methodology
for a situation where the weapons were not predetermined
seems intuitive. The Counter force Potentials model's treatment
of the indirect fire systems in that they cannot be compared
or ranked with the direct fire systems makes the force mix
analysis difficult and unsystematic. The model's purpose is
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to be useful in force mix analysis and currently it is not
as useful as it could be expected to be. The model needs an
internal methodology to approach the force mix analysis faced
by the user. Once this methodology is provided for the user
the model gives a methodology to compare the force mix rela-
tionships, the force ratio.
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IV. COMPARISONS AND NUMERICAL SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, four methodologies of imputing value to
weapon types are examined and compared. The four methodolo-
gies are the "subjective" firepower score method, the product
firepower score method, the eigenvalue method, and the Counter-
force Potentials method.
A hypothetical scenario is given and the force ratio is
calculated for each methodology. A comparison of weapon order
rankings and the force ratios is made to test the consisten-
cies among the methodologies.
Numerical sensitivity analysis is applied to the Counter-
force Potentials model to investigate the relationships of
increases in direct and indirect fire systems to the changes
in force ratio. Numerical sensitivity is also used to examine
the force mix trade off analysis for the scenario. The force
mix investigation includes both the direct and indirect fire
weapon types.
B. THE SCENARIO
The scenario chosen for the analysis is a meeting engage-
ment between an armored heavy U.S. division and two soviet
motorized rifle divisions. The range for our engagement is
between 1000-2000 meters. Allocation of fire is limited only
to the fractional allocation by numbers of available targets
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option. The weapon systems considered are limited to four
types for each force.
TABLE 7
The Scenario
U.S. Division Soviet Division
ITEM Quantity ITEM Quantity
Tank M60A3 320 Tank T72 540
TOW ( ITV) 50 BMP 108
Helo AH-1 18 Helo Hind 24
How. 155mm 36 How. 122sp 86
C. "SUBJECTIVE" FIREPOWER SCORES
A committee of military officers were given the scenario
and asked to assign values to the weapon systems based upon















1. "Subjective" Blue Force Value
The blue force value is equal to the sum of the weapon









"Subjective" Red Force Value
The red force value (V ) is formed the same way as




. VR is 52779.
j=l 3 3
3. Force Ratio
The force ratio is equal to the blue force value
divided by the red force value (v/V ) . The force ratio
equals .5945.
D. PRODUCT METHOD
The product method uses the product of lethality times
the expected expenditures of ammunition to obtain the weapon
values. The weapon values for the scenario were extracted
from FM-10 5-5 which uses the product method to obtain the
values of the weapon types [4] .
TABLE 9
Product Scenario Results













Using the formula v = V v. x q . , the value of the
i=l
blue force is 16516.
2 Red Force Value
R r R RUsing the formula V = £ V. x q. , the value of the
j-1 D ^
red force is 27160.
3. Force Ratio
The force ratio (V^/V1*) equals .608.
E. EIGENVALUE METHOD
This method uses an APL program entitled "Poten" which is
available at the Naval Postgraduate School.
In order to use the program the attrition matrices a.
.
and b. . had to be developed. They were approximated by the
product of acquisition rate, target selection fraction, and




BMP Tank How Hind
TOW .025 2.8 0.0 0.0
Tank . 5 2.1 0.0 0.001
How .05 1.8 1.8 0.0
AH-1 .05 2.52 2.6 1.0
Hartman , James K. , Unpublished class notes on Mathemati-




b . . Matrix
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Tank How AH-1
BMP .03 2.5 0.0 0.0
Tank .5 2.0 0.0 0.0001
How .04 1.5 1.8 0.0
Hind .05 2.5 2.5 0.99













1. Blue Force Value
Using the formula v
blue force is 1366.08.
2. Red Force Value




the value of the
, S 1 1i=l
" R R




3 . Force Ratio
The force ratio (VVV1*) equals .599.
F. COUNTERFORCE POTENTIALS MODEL
Allowing the model to run using the given scenario the
following weapon values are obtained:
TABLE 13
Counterforce Scenario Results




No values are assigned to the howtizers as they are an indi-
rect fire system. Their effects are included in the values
of the other systems.
1. Blue Force Value






R r R RUsing the formula V" = V. -< Q . , the red force





The force ratio (V^/VR ) equals .60.

G. COMPARISON OF THE MODELS
The weapon order rankings and the force ratios are inves-
tigated for consistency.
1. Weapon Rank Orderings
The ordering are displayed in Table 14.
TABLE 14
Rank Order of Weapons
Subjective Product Eigenvalue Counterforce
HIGHEST AH-1 AH-1 AH-1 Tank
Tank TOW Howitzer AH-1
Howitzer Howitzer Tank TOW
LOWEST TOW Tank TOW
The rank orderings are not consistent. The lack of
consistency in weapon order ranking should alarm the reader.
Each method orders the weapons in accordance with
different criteria. Examining the tank across the methods
shows the tank varies from the lowest in the product method
to the highest in the counterforce method. One should expect
the methods to yield somewhat consistent results for the same
scenario with the same weapons. Each method measures the
value of a weapon in accordance with certain characteristics
of the weapon. These characteristics are similar but are
quantified differently. One should expect similar characteris-
tics to be ordered consistently for the same weapon.
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2 . Force Ratios
The force ratios calculated from each methodology








The force ratios appear to be consistent. The consis-
tency reveals that although we may value systems differently
according to different characteristics, the ratio of the two
opposing forces is approximately equal among the methodologies
for the sample scenario investigated.
The force ratio was examined to see if the Counter-
force Potentials model yielded radically different results
from other models already used in combat modeling. It is
concluding that for the sample the model yields a result
which is consistent with known models.
H. NUMERICAL SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
1. General
In order to realize the difficulty in the Counter-
force Potentials' theoretical sensitivity analysis, a
35

comparison is shown between it and the subjective WEI/WUV





















of x and y
force
levels
Figure 8. Models Comparison
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As displayed in the figure the force ratio is formed
from the same expression. The characteristics of the ex-
pression are critical to the force mix and sensitivity
analysis
.
In the WEI/WUV method the value of each weapon is
independent of the quantity of weapons to be examined. The
incremental increases in weapon numbers display the same in-
creasing linear rate of the force ratio for increases of the
same weapon by the same amount. The weapon with the highest
individual value improves the force ratio the most. The
marginal worth of the weapon increases is readily calculated
but the linearity of the method makes its use suspect for
force mix analysis.
In the Counterforce Potentials model the values of the
weapons are dependent on the force levels and the scenario.
Increases in a blue weapon quantity not only affect the value
of the blue force but also can affect every weapon value in
the opposing force. This makes any attempt at a straight-
forward algebraic sensitivity and force mix analysis extremely
difficult.
For this reason numerical analysis is used to investi-
gate the relationships to see if the model is linear and if
it displays diminishing marginal returns.
2 . Numerical Analysis
a. Force Ratio Versus Weapon Quantity Changes
From the scenario's basic weapon input quantities,
an investigation into the relationships of all blue weapon
17

increases to the force ratio is made. In each case the weapon
under investigation is increased by varying amounts. For
each weapon increase, all other weapon quantities for the
red and blue force remain constant. These weapon increases
are displayed in Table 16.
TABLE 16
Force Ratio Versus Weapon Changes
Type Force A Force Slope
Weapon Quantity AQ Ratio Ratio (AQ/AFR)
Tanks 320 — .60 — —
326 6 .61 .01 .00166
338 12 .64 .03 .0025
374 36 .72 .08 .0022
640 320 1.38 .66 .002
1000 360 2.17 .79 .002
10000 9000 18.26 16.09 .002
TOW(ITH) 50 — .60
53 3 .61 .01 .0031
56 3 .61 .00 .00
68 12 .63 .02 .0016
100 32 .70 .07 .002
AH-1 18 — .60 — --
24 6 .61 .01 .00166
36 12 .64 .03 .0025
Howitzer 36 — .60 --
42 6 .60
54 12 .60
72 18 .61 .01 .0003
90 18 .61
AQ = difference QNEW - Q-NEW-
1
AFR = difference FR^ - FR^,
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In Table 16, the slope (change in force ratio/change
in weapon quantity) is examined because the slope represents
the rate at which the output (force ratio) changes due to the
input (weapon) changes. The rate of change for each increase
of the same weapon is approximately the same. As displayed
in the graphs (Figures 9-12) the relationships appear to be
linear.
It is critical to point out that the Counterforce
Potentials model rounds the force ratio to the nearest 100th.
In the case of the howitzers this rounding makes the graph
almost useless for examination.
These graphs tend to indicate constant returns to
scale and show the model fails to exhibit diminishing marginal
returns. Diminishing marginal returns is a property where as
the quantity of a weapon is increased, the rate of increase
of the FR is not constant, but rather diminishes. Ultimately
a point might be reached where the force ratio actually de-
creases for further weapon increases. This has been called
the saturation point of a weapon. This property is a must for
force mix analysis. This model fails to display diminishing
marginal returns
.
Linear models do not possess this property. In linear
models weapon increases always result in force ratio increases
Thus the effect of one weapon dominating the force mix is
highly probable. Linearity is a shortcoming noted in force
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Figure 12. Force Ratio Versus Howitzers
Note that the rounding off of the force ratio makes the
actual graph unknown for the howitzers.
b. Statistical Test for Linearity
Due to the results of the model runs, a statis-
tical F test was run for each weapon to test if its relation-
ship to the force ratio was linear. Appendix B contains the
statistical F tests. The results of the test reveal that one
rejects the insignificance of the linear coefficients hypothe-
sis at the .05 and .01 significance levels. Thus the F test





In force mix analysis there are two methods: the
predetermined and not predetermined methods . In the predeter-
mined force mix questions, which will be referred to as the
predetermined case, the user knows which weapons and what
quantities are desired for investigation. In the not pre-
determined force mix questions, which will be referred to as
the flagged case, the user allows the model to flag the weapon
to be investigated.
The predetermined case questions are easily
answered by the model. For example, suppose in our scenario
it was critical to know whether to increase the tank force
by one platoon or the artillery by one battery. Running the
model with these changes shows the tanks improve the force
ratio more than the artillery battery. Thus the recommenda-
tion would be made to increase tanks by one platoon.
The flagged case questions are not as easily
answered. For example, suppose the commander wanted to im-
prove his force ratio. The user would have to rerun the model
with all possible force increases in order to answer the force
mix question. The optimal solution may be omitted by user
error and never achieved.
d. Trade Off Analysis
Through numerical analysis an investigation is
made into the number of each blue weapon needed in order to
increase the force ratio by the same amount. Our goal is to
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determine if the quantity of weapons required to achieve a




ITEM QUANTITY QUANTITY DIFFERENCE RATIO
Tanks 320 326 6 .61
TOW 50 53 3 .61
AH-1 18 24 6 .61
How 36 90 54 .61
As shown in the table, the relationship of the
direct fire weapons (tank , TOW, AH-1) seem reasonable. The
relationships says that a platoon of tanks is equal to a
platoon of TOWs or a platoon of AH-ls.
It does not seem reasonable that a platoon of
any of these direct fire weapons would be equal to a battalion
plus of artillery. This is a significant flaw in the model's





The Counterforce Potentials model has significant flaws
which make it questionable for use in force mix analysis.
The flaws discovered in the trade off analysis and the model's
linear traits make the model suspect for use in the force mix
analysis. The model seems not to display diminishing marginal
returns which is a must for a model to be used for force mix
analysis
.
The model's strengths are in the following areas:
(1) Quantifying for each weapon type, more battlefield
interrelationships within the P. . and the P. matrices than
the previous firepower score or AP-P models. These interrela-
tionships include the calculation of K. . with its attributes
ID
and the use of the indirect submodules to calculate E. which
1
are both used to calculate the P. .'s.
(2) The straightforward flow of the submodules.
(3) The Counterforce Potentials force ratio is consistent
with other linear models thus showing no radical numerical
results
.
The model's weaknesses include;
(1) There does not exist a value for the indirect fire
systems which can be realistically compared to the value of
the direct fire systems.
(2) The battlefield characteristics are not all quanti-
fied in an accurate or believable fashion.
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(3) The model does not allow the artillery to fire mass
or concentration of fires at a target or target group.
(4) The indirect fire submodule yields results which are
not intuitively plausible as shown in the trade off analysis
between the direct and indirect weapons.
(5) The model tends to be linear in the relationship
between changes in force ratio and weapon quantities thus the
model will not flag foolish combinations of weapon mixes.
(6) The model does not exhibit diminishing marginal
returns
.
(7) The model excludes the foot soldier and his basic
weapons
(8) The model does not allow the direct fire weapons to




In order to improve the model the following recommenda-
tions are suggested:
(1) A value which can be realistically compared to the
direct fire systems needs to be developed for the indirect
fire systems.
(2) The direct fire weapons need to be able to engage
susceptible indirect fire weapons.
(3) Foot soldiers need to be included in the model.
(4) Degradation of rounds for both counterbattery and
countermaneuver need to be included in the model.
(5) Replace the user specified susceptibility for counter-
battery fires with the probability of detection and the proba-
bility of engagement given a detection, and modify the section
appropriately
.
(6) The indirect fire submodules should reflect the
artillery's ability to mass fires on known large enemy force
locations
.
(7) The order of the indirect fire submodules must be
examined and modified to reflect the tactics and artillery
missions being employed in the scenario.
(8) Increase the fractional allocational options for the
direct fire systems to include the fractional effectiveness
factor of the opposing system (E.) with the quantity of that
weapon (Q.) to use E. < Q . in lieu of just Q..
J j 1 J
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(9) Improve the model so the indirect fire systems dis-
play a more logical trade off analysis with the direct fire
weapons
.
The following are suggested areas of future investigations
(1) The consistency of the computer program to the
theoretical documentation.
(2) A complete numerical analysis for all the input
parameters of the model to examine their effects on the
outputs
.
(3) Validate the model with data collected in major






This appendix contains a summary of the Counterforce
Potentials computer runs which were used to perform the
numerical analysis in Chapter IV.
B. SCENARIO DATA
The scenario data is the same base case as shown in
Chapter IV. The inputs are varied in each test run and the
resulting values and force ratios are shown in this appendix.
C. TEST RESULTS
1. Howitzer Changes
In these runs the howitzers were varied from 36 (base
case) to 42, 54, 72, and 90. These quantities were chosen to
represent changes of one battery, one company, one battalion,
and one battalion plus reinforcements,
a. Case: 42 Howitzers
Blue force value: 356.7
Red Force Value: 59 3.
Force Ratio: .60





M60 ITH AH-1 T72 BMP Hind
Value 1.00 .51 .65 1.01 .26 .77
Quan
.
320 50 18 540 108 24
Total 319 25 12 546 28 18
Case: 54 Howitzers
Blue force value: 356.7




M60 ITH AH-1 T72 BMP Hind
Value 1.00 .51 .66 1.01 .25 .77
Quan. 320 50 18 540 108 24
Total 319 25 12 544 27 18
c. Case: 72 Howitzers
The blue force value: 356.7
The red force value: 585.3





M60 ITH AH-1 T72 BMP Hind
Value 1.00 .51 . 6 6 1.00 .25 .76
Quan. 320 50 18 540 108 24
Total 319 26 12 540 27 18
d. Case: 90 Howitzers
Blue force value: 356.7




M60 ITH AH-1 T72 BMP Hind
Value 1.00 .51 .66 .99 .24 .76
Quan
.
320 50 18 540 108 24
Total 319 25 12 537 26 18
2 . Tank Changes
In this section the tanks were varied by 6, 18, and
54. These correspond to increases by a platoon, a company,




a. Case: 326 Tanks
Blue force value: 362.7




M60 ITH AH-1 T72 BMP Hind
Value 1.00 .51 .66 1.01 .26 .76
Quan
.
326 50 18 540 108 24
Total 325 26 12 546 28 18
b. Case: 338 Tanks
Blue force value: 374.8




M60 ITH AH-1 T72 BMP Hind
Value 1.0 .51 .66 1.0 .26 .75
Quan 338 50 18 540 108 24
Total 337 26 12 542 287 18
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c. Case: 374 Tanks
Blue force value: 410.:




M60 ITH AH-1 T72 BMP Hind
Value 1.00 .51 .66 .98 .25 .72
Quan. 374 50 24 540 10 8 24
Total 373 26 12 529 27 17
d. Case: 640 Tanks
The blue force value: 6 70.2
The red force value: 4 84.8
The force ratio: 1.38
TABLE 2 5
Tanks (640)
M60 ITH AH-1 T72 BMP Hind
Value 1.00 .43 .56 .83 .20 .58
Quan
.
640 50 24 540 108 24
Total 639 22 10 449 22 14
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e. Case: 1000 Tanks
The blue force value: 10 2 7.2
The red force value: 473.3
The force ratio: 2.17
TABLE 26
Tanks (1000)
M60 ITH AH-1 T72 BMP Hind
Value 1.00 .40 .52 .81 .20 .56
Quan
.
1000 50 24 540 10 8 24
Total 998 20 9 438 21 13
f. Case: 10000 Tanks
The blue force value: 10006.4
The red force value: 54 7.9
The force ratio: 18.26
TABLE 2 7
Tanks (10000)
M60 ITH AH-1 T72 BMP Hind
Value 1.00 .39 .50 .94 .23 .63
Quan . 10000 50 24 540 103 24




The TOW was varied by 3, 6 and 18. These represent
changes in TOWs of a section, company, and a squadron of an
armored cavalry squadron. The TOWs were also doubled to 50
a. Case: 5 3 TOWs
Blue force value: 358.2




M60 ITH AH-1 T72 BMP Hind
Value 1.00 .51 .66 1.00 .26 .76
Quan
.
320 53 18 540 108 24
Total 319 29 12 542 28 18
b. Case: 5 6 TOWs
Blue force value: 359.8




M60 ITH AH-1 T72 BMP Hind
Value 1.00 .51 .66 1.00 .26 .76
Quan 320 56 18 540 108 24
Total 319 29 12 542 28 18
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c. Case: 6 8 TOWs
Blue force value: 366.1




M60 ITH AH-1 T72 BMP Hind
Value 1.00 .51 .66 .99 .25 .75
Quan
.
320 68 18 540 108 24
Total 319 35 12 533 27 18
d. Case: 100 TOWs
Blue force value: 3 82.7




M60 ITH AH-1 T72 BMP Hind
Value 1.00 .51 .67 .94 .23 .72
Quan. 320 100 13 540 10 8 24
Total 319 51 12 508 25 17
4. AH-1 Changes
The AH-1 helicopter is varied by 6 and 18. These
represent changes of a platoon and a ccmpany size.
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a. Case: 24 AH-ls
Blue force value; 360.8




M60 ITH AH-1 T72 BMP Hind
Value 1.00 .51 .66 1.00 .27 .77
Quan
.
320 50 24 540 108 24
Total 319 26 16 542 29 19
b. Case: 36 AH-ls
Blue force value: 369.1




M60 ITH AH-1 T72 BP4P Hind
Value 1.00 .51 .67 .98 .27 .77
Quan . 320 50 36 540 10 8 24






For each weapon a statistical F test was run on the
hypothesis that the relationship between the weapon increases





Hypothesis Test for Linearity
a. Hypothesis (HQ )
All the parameters are insignificant (no relation-
ship between data) .
b. Alternate Hypothesis (H,)




Reject the null hypothesis (HQ ) if F is greater
than or equal to F





Tanks (5,5) 8.47 4.28
TCW (4,4) 16.0 6.39
AH-1 (3,3) 29.5 9.23








Letting Y be a vector of the force ratio for tank
changes and X be a vector of the quantity of tanks resulting
in the force ratio change, a regression was run on Y versus
X.
TABLE 35
Regression Force Ratio vs Tanks






coefficient: .10 87 t-stat: 1.7785
coefficient: .0018 t-stat: 113.45






Using the same format, the regression yielded:
TABLE 36
Regression Force Ratio vs TOW
Source DF Sum Square Mean Square F-STAT
381.3regression 1 6.55E-3 6.55E-3






coefficients: .501 and .002, t-stats 73.02 and 19.53





Using the same format the regression yields:
TABLE 3 7
Regression Force Ratio vs AH-1
Source DF Sum Squares Mean Square F-STAT
regression 1 8.59E-4 8.5 8E-4 120.3
residual 1 7.14E-6 7.14E-6
total 2 8.66E-4
R square : .99 2
Std error: .0026
coefficients: .5579 and .0023, t-stats 99.99
and 10.9 7










Regression Force Ratio vs Artillery
Source DF S urn Square Mean Square F-STAT
regression 1 6.78E-5 6.7 8E-5 18.89




coefficients: .592 and .0002 with t-stats 220.5
and 4.34
Reject H~ since 18.89 is greater than F
C. SUMMARY
In each case the testing yielded a large value for the F
statistic which indicated rejection of the null hypothesis
(H
n
) . The fact that some parameters may be significant
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